Physicians' brain drain - A gravity model of migration flows by Botezat, Alina & Ramos Lobo, Raúl
RESEARCH Open Access
Physicians’ brain drain - a gravity model of
migration flows
Alina Botezat1* and Raul Ramos2
Abstract
Background: The past two decades have been marked by impressive growth in the migration of medical doctors.
The medical profession is among the most mobile of highly skilled professions, particularly in Europe, and is also
the sector that experiences the most serious labour shortages. However, surprisingly little is known about how
medical doctors choose their destinations. In addition, the literature is scarce on the factors determining the sharp
rise in the migration of doctors from Africa, Asia and Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and how the last economic
crisis has shaped the migration flows of health professionals.
Methods: We use the new module on health worker migration provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) for 2000–2016 in order to examine the channels through which OECD
countries attract foreign physicians from abroad. We estimate a gravity model using the Pseudo-Poisson Maximum
Likelihood estimator.
Results: Our results reveal that a lower unemployment rate, good remuneration of physicians, an aging population,
and a high level of medical technology at the destination are among the main drivers of physicians’ brain drain.
Furthermore, an analysis of the mobility of medical doctors from a number of regions worldwide shows that
individuals react differently on a country-wise basis to various determinants present in the destination countries.
Physicians from African countries are particularly attracted to destination countries offering higher wages, and to
those where the density of medical doctors is relatively low. Concurrently, a higher demand for healthcare services
and better medical technology in the receiving country drives the inflow of medical doctors from Central and
Eastern Europe, while Asian doctors seem to preferentially migrate to countries with better school systems.
Conclusions: This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the channels through which OECD countries
attract foreign medical doctors from abroad. We find that, apart from dyadic factors, a lower unemployment rate,
good remuneration of physicians, an aging population, and good medical infrastructure in the host country are
among the main drivers of physicians’ brain drain. Furthermore, we find that utility from migration to specific
countries may be explained by the heterogeneity of origin countries.
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Introduction
The migration of tertiary educated people from poor to
rich countries has become an increasingly important fea-
ture of international migration. Over the past few de-
cades, the stock of highly-skilled immigrants in member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) grew at a much
faster rate than low-skilled workers [1]. The major
determinants underlying this trend are: the worldwide
expansion of education, declines in migration costs, and
the increased role of human capital in economic devel-
opment; all of which has led policymakers to increase at-
tempts to attract specialised workforces from abroad [2].
One critical dimension of skilled migration, is the per-
sistently higher mobility rates of health professionals.
The medical profession is among the most mobile of
highly skilled professions, particularly in Europe. It is
also the sector that experiences the most serious labour
shortages [3, 4].
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However, surprisingly little is known about how med-
ical doctors choose their destinations. The main reason
for this knowledge gap is a lack of appropriate data. To
the best of our knowledge, there are only three datasets
on physician migration: First, the OECD Health Statis-
tics - Health Workforce Migration dataset, which con-
tains yearly observations on foreign-trained health
professionals for the OECD countries, but the temporal
coverage is unbalanced [e.g., for France: 2011–2014, for
Germany: 2000–2014]. Second, the dataset of Clemens
et al. [5], with data on the emigration of African physi-
cians from nine destinations countries in 2000 [3]; the
dataset of Bhargava et al. [6], which extends the database
of Clemens and Pettersson [7] and includes observations
from 18 additional countries from 1991 to 2004.
In our paper, we take advantage of the new module on
health worker migration provided by the OECD for
2000–2016, in order to examine the determinants of mi-
gration flows of foreign-trained physicians. We employ a
gravity-type estimation model using the Pseudo-Poisson
Maximum Likelihood estimator, developed by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro [8]. Our focus is on the pull factors,
since the impact of push factors on emigration rates is
comparatively small, as shown by Mayda [9]. In particu-
lar, Mayda finds a clear asymmetry between the push
and pull factors that explain migration flows between 14
OECD countries and the rest of the world. While the
statistical significance of pull factors is very robust to
different specifications, the effect for push factors is
much smaller and statistically insignificant in several
models. He provides a tentative explanation: this result
could be related to the moderating effect of destination
countries’ migration policies, which can become more
restrictive when migration pressures increase due to
changes in pull factors.
Our paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold.
First, while many studies document the effects of phys-
ician emigration on various health and socio-economic
outcomes in the sending countries [6, 10–12], a much
smaller subset focus on the determinants of the direc-
tion of migration flows for medical doctors. In one of
very few studies which analyse the migration of medical
physicians from 144 origin countries to 18 destination
countries over the period 1995–2004, Yakovlev and
Steinkopf [13] show that physicians are most attracted
to countries characterised by greater economic freedom,
a lower share of public health expenditures, and higher
health spending per capita. Employing the same estima-
tion strategy, our paper is most closely related to Moul-
lan [14], who uses the data of Bhargava et al. [6] to
study bilateral flows of foreign-trained medical doctors
for the years 1991–2004. He finds that one of the main
drivers is the healthcare market. Inflows of foreign-
trained doctors are higher in OECD countries with a low
density of doctors and with high social expenditures on
healthcare. We add to this emerging line of research by
investigating the factors determining the absorptive cap-
acity of medical doctor inflows from abroad. Using recent
data, 2000 to 2016, which covers the period when the mi-
gration of medical doctors increased significantly, we are
able to provide new insights into the phenomenon of phy-
sicians’ brain drain.
In addition, very little is known about the factors de-
termining the sharp rise in the migration of doctors
from Africa, Asia, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and
how the last economic crisis shaped the migration flows
of health professionals. Our paper fills this gap, and
shows that utility from migration to a specific destin-
ation varies in magnitude both across categories of ori-
gin countries and over time.
Our research also adds to a new strand of literature
that employs gravity models to investigate migration
flows [15–22]. Among them, only a few use data on
highly-skilled migrants. A notable example is Czaika and
Parsons [19], where the authors use data for 10 OECD
destinations and 185 sending countries over the period
2000–2012 to analyse which kind of migration policies
favour the inflow of highly-skilled labour migrants.
Material and methods
Theoretical framework
In this section we briefly present the theoretical micro-
foundations to the choice of destination country. By
comparing costs with benefits, a rational individual will
choose a destination that maximises utility. Formally,
the utility function is specified based on the random util-
ity framework introduced by McFadden [23]. This repre-
sents the starting point for the Random Utility
Maximisation [RUM] models used in the migration lit-
erature to derive migration flow specifications. Following
Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga [24], the basic
RUM model takes the following form:
Uijk ¼ V jk þ ϵijk ¼ wjk−cjk þ ϵijk ð1Þ
where Uijk represents the utility of individual i after mi-
gration from country j to country k. wjk represents the
deterministic component of the utility, and cjk the costs
of moving from j to k. ϵjk is an individual stochastic
component of utility. If it is assumed that ϵijk has ex-
treme value type-I distribution, we can apply the results
in McFadden [23] and show that the probability of







where d represents any possible destination out of the
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set of country choices D. Similarly, the probability of







Now we calculate the odds ratio of migrating to k ver-






  ¼ exp wjk−cjk−wjj
  ð4Þ
Thus, the odds ratio of migrating to k versus staying in
j will depend on the attractiveness of the destination
country (wjk), the costs of migration (cjk), and on the
foregone utility of staying in country j (wjj).
But in reality, the decision to migrate is not based
solely on push and pull factors present in the source and
destination countries, but also on the relative opportun-
ities and/or obstacles that other possible destinations
simultaneously exhibit. In economics, Anderson and
Van Wincoop [25] first formalised this idea in the
gravity model of international trade as ‘multilateral re-
sistance’. In the migration literature, Bertoli and Fernán-
dez-Huertas Moraga [24] introduced this term, referring
to the” multilateral resistance to migration” as” the influ-
ence exerted by the opportunities [barriers] to migrate to
other destinations”. Hence, as shown by Bertoli and Fer-
nández -Huertas Moraga [24], the denominator in [2],
which captures the attractiveness of other destinations,
should depend on k as well.
Failing to control for these ‘third-country’ effects in
the estimation of a gravity model of migration might
lead to biased results. The influence of alternative desti-
nations can confound identification of the effects of vari-
ous determinants on the bilateral migration flows. In
this sense, various empirical approaches have been pro-
posed to tackle the problem (for an overview, see Head
and Mayer [26] or Ramos [27]). For instance, Bertoli and
Fernández-Huertas Moraga [24] and Bertoli et al. [28]
suggest using the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) es-
timator of Pesaran [29] to account for potential biases
due to multilateral resistance. This technique is particu-
larly suitable when the data set is very large in terms of
bilateral observations and time periods. But the most
common approach in the literature is to use fixed-effects
methods to control for multilateral resistance to migra-
tion. Bertoli et al. [28] include dyadic fixed effects and
time fixed effects in the specifications to get unbiased es-
timates. Much less demanding in terms of data are the
solutions proposed by Ortega and Peri [21] and Beine
and Parsons [30], who use origin-year fixed effects or
destination-year dummies.
For this reason, we follow the methodology applied by
Ortega and Peri [21], and use origin-time fixed effects
(see Eq. 5). Since our primary focus is on the ‘pull’ fac-
tors of migration determining choice of destination, by
using origin-year dummy variables we are able to control
for all” push” determinants present in sending countries.
Estimation strategy
This section explains the econometric framework used
to estimate bilateral flows of foreign-trained physicians
through a gravity model approach. The estimable equa-
tion is as follows:
njkt ¼ β1 lnXk;t−1
 þ β2 ln djk
 þ β3 Cjk
 
þ β4 EUjkt
 þ β5 lnmjk;t−1
 þ μjt þ δk
þ ϵjkt ð5Þ
The dependent variable njkt represents physicians’ mi-
gration flows from country j to country k. The subscripts
j, k, and t refer to origin countries, destination countries,
and time, respectively. The vector Xk, t − 1 includes our
main variables of interest related to a destination’s char-
acteristics. For this, we include destination time-variant
variables, lagged over one period. Here we refer to GDP
per capita, unemployment rate, remuneration of physi-
cians, and PISA reading score (as a proxy for the quality
of the education system). Furthermore, we include vari-
ables describing a range of factors that affect both the
supply of- and demand for health workers. By lagging
these variables, we attempt to control for reverse causal-
ity [14]. Other controls include time-invariant bilateral
factors, such as physical distance between origin and des-
tination country (djk), a common border, and cultural
links (colonial heritage, common language, Cjk). Two
dummies that indicate EU and Schengen membership of
pair countries are also included as controls. We add a
variable for diaspora, defined as the stock of highly-skilled
immigrants trained in country j and living in country k at
the start of period t. A detailed description of the variables
is presented in the next Section. Finally, we add time-
varying origin dummies μjt to control for time-variant fac-
tors at origin, and destination fixed effects (δk) to control
for destination-invariant characteristics.
We estimate Eq. 5 by means of the Poisson-Pseudo-
Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) approach proposed by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro [8]. This method has several
advantages. Firstly, a PPML estimator is fully consistent
with the underlying random utility maximisation pre-
sented above. Secondly, the estimator is robust to differ-
ent patterns of heteroskedasticity [8]. Thirdly, a PPML
estimator is particularly suitable in regressions where the
dependent variable has a significant proportion of zero
values [30, 31]. In our case, 84.01% of our bilateral flows
is equal to zero. Regarding the functional form, when
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using PPML, the dependent variable is in levels and all
of the continuous independent variables are in logarith-
mic form (see Eq. 5). Aside from accounting for multilat-
eral resistance to migration, the inclusion of origin-time
fixed effects in Eq. 5 warrants that the Poisson-pseudo-
maximum- likelihood estimates are always consistent with
heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate [17, 32].
Data and descriptive statistics
The data for the empirical analysis was gathered from
various sources, and covers the time period 2000 to
2016. The origin and destination countries are listed in
the Appendix. The selection of the variables is mainly
based on previous studies of highly-skilled migration,
physicians’ migration and the empirical specifications of
the underlying random utility model (see Czaika and
Parsons [19], Moullan [14], among others).
Dependent variable: immigration flows
Our key dependent variable is the dyadic inflow njkt
and represents the inflow of medical doctors from
country of origin j to country of destination k at time
t. The data is provided by the OECD within the new
module on health worker migration,1 which contains
data on inflows and outflows of doctors and nurses
across countries [33]. The OECD Health Migration
Data has three main advantages. First, it covers all
OECD countries as destination countries. Secondly,
the data, jointly collected by OECD, Eurostat, and
WHO-Europe is comparable across countries. The
data is on foreign-trained doctors, representing the
number of doctors who obtained their first medical
qualification (degree) in another country and who are
licensed to practice in the receiving country. This is
particularly important, since focus on place of train-
ing is the most relevant for measuring ‘brain drain’
[33]. Finally, the data is reported annually, making it
possible to monitor trends in health workforce migra-
tion on a yearly basis.
Explanatory variables
As destination-time-variant variables, we use the fol-
lowing. We include the ratio of GDP per capita for
the country of origin relative to the GDP per capita
for the country of destination, as a proxy for the gap
in economic development and absorption capacity be-
tween both countries [34, 35]. A smaller ratio of GDP
per capita might indicate a greater probability of
obtaining higher income levels in the destination
country [21, 30], which represents a key factor in the
decision to migrate [36]. The data is taken from the
World Bank.2
We also consider the unemployment rate in the des-
tination country.3 Since employment exhibits a higher
sensitivity to shocks than wages [16, 37], it represents a
relevant ‘pull’ factor in the migration process; particu-
larly for highly skilled migrants, given that a region
which attracts an increasingly skilled inflow of migrants
generally sees a higher average employment level [37].
We also control for quality of the education system in
the destination country, given that physicians who con-
sider emigration may also be concerned about the qual-
ity of education available to their children. For this, we
use PISA reading score,4 since cognitive skills measured
by PISA constitute a reliable proxy for school quality
[38]. As PISA test scores are measured every 3 years, for
those years we have no new scores available we assign
the last available PISA test score (for years 2001 and
2002, the value from 2000; for years 2004 and 2005, the
values from 2003, and so on).
In the literature, the existence of networks is expected
to decrease migration costs, and favour migration flows
[19, 39–41]. In order to control for network external-
ities, we follow Anjomani and Hariri [42] and include in
our model the migration stocks of highly-skilled co-
nationals from year 2000 (those with the same country
of training, and who reside in the respective destination
country). To do this, we use the Database on Immigrants
in OECD Countries5 (DIOC), which includes informa-
tion on place of birth and educational attainment.
Following the approach in gravity models of inter-
national migration, we control for time-invariant dyadic
variables that also influence migration costs. For ex-
ample, the physical distance between two countries is
expected to be negatively correlated with migration in-
flows [43]. Likewise, linguistic proximity affects migra-
tion costs [44], particularly in the case of health
professionals [45]. The measures of the distances be-
tween geographical regions, colonial relationships, offi-
cial languages, and a common border are taken from the
online database of the Centre d’Études Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).6
In addition, we entered two dummy variables for EU
and Schengen membership, as a common membership
to one of these agreements may facilitate the free move-
ment of people [19, 21]. Of course, we take into account
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Given the purpose of the paper, we also look at the
factors that describe the functioning of the health labour
market in the destination countries. Following Moullan
[14] and OECD [46], and given the available data, we
consider the following factors affecting the supply and
demand of medical doctors. The supply of health
workers is mainly determined by the number of people
practicing in the system. We control for the supply of
medical doctors measured by the density of physicians
per 1000 individuals.7 In addition, we also consider the
number of medical graduates, defined as the number of
students who have graduated from medical schools or
similar institutions in a given year.8 The supply of med-
ical doctors is also driven by the salary level. A higher
salary may indicate an increase in hours for those work-
ing in the system, as well as an increase in the attractive-
ness of the medical profession. Given that higher-skilled
workers are attracted by high wages [47], higher salary
levels for medical doctors may also trigger an outward
migration of health professionals from other countries.
As an indicator for medical doctors’ pay, we use the re-
muneration for specialists, defined as the average gross
annual income, including social security contributions
and income taxes payable by the employee.9 Since data
for this indicator is not available for all years in the
OECD database, we also use data on average wages10 to
compute the ratio between specialists’ wages and average
years in a specific year and country, for which data is
available. Using this ratio, and full data on average
wages, we compute the remuneration of medical doctors
for the missing years. In addition, we include a proxy for
medical infrastructure and health care resources in a
given country, as measured by the total number of com-
puted tomography scanners per million individuals11
available each year in the health system. We expect a
country with a rich medical infrastructure to be attract-
ive to medical doctors from abroad. On the demand side
of the health labour market, we consider the following
variables: governmental health spending, health care
coverage, age dependency ratio, and the number of hos-
pital beds. Health spending per capita12 is an indicator
of the capacity to pay health professionals from public
resources, and is a good proxy for the degree of govern-
ment involvement in the provision of healthcare. It is ex-
pected that countries for which health spending per
capita is high will attract more medical doctors from
abroad [13]. Health care coverage,13 measured as the
share of the population covered by health insurance, is
highly correlated with demand for health services. Simi-
larly, the age dependency ratio,14 which is the ratio of
older dependents (people older than 64) to the working-
age population (aged 15–64), is an important demo-
graphic factor affecting the demand for health care
services [13]. Finally, the number of hospital beds15 de-
scribes the physical health care infrastructure, and repre-
sents a good proxy for the inpatient sector [48].
Descriptive statistics on all variables are reported in
Table 1.
Results
We estimate Eq. 5 in several specifications. The results
are reported in Table 2. The baseline specification in
column (1) only includes controls for destination and
conventional dyadic factors. In model (2), we add con-
trol variables describing the supply of medical doctors.
In column (3) we include the demand factors, while col-
umn (4) presents the results for the full model. Finally,
in the last column we also include an indicator for med-
ical infrastructure, for which we have fewer observations.
The results reveal that, with the exception of GDP per
capita ratio and PISA literacy score, the coefficients are
similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance
across all specifications.
The coefficient estimate for the variable accounting for
the unemployment rate in the destination countries is
negative, and highly statistically significant in the full
model. This indicates that the destinations with lower
unemployment rates are those that attract an increased
number of foreign medical doctors. Next, the results for
our preferred specification (column 5) suggest that PISA
test score, our proxy for education quality in the destin-
ation country, is positively correlated with higher inflows
of medical doctors.
Further, results in columns (4) and (5) show positive
and statistically significant effects of the GDP ratio on
migration flows. In fact, we note that for specifications
in which we control for remuneration of physicians (col-
umns 2, 4 and 5), the estimates turn positive.
We also note that the stock of highly-skilled co-
nationals in the destination country does not seem to
matter for the next waves of physician inflows.
Next, we examine the influence of the standard dyadic
control variables on migration flows. The results reveal that
these variables all have the expected sign. The distance vari-
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estimates are statistically significant and similar in magni-
tude. The estimated coefficient for Log Distance (last col-
umn) suggests that a 10% increase in bilateral distance is,
on average, associated with a 6.35% reduction in migration
flows of medical doctors. Further, a colonial relationship is
positively correlated with migration flows of medical doc-
tors. The language coefficients all have a positive sign, again
as expected, and have the highest magnitude among all
dyadic controls. The coefficient on Common language
dummy from our full model (column 4), suggests that if
two countries share the same language, they experience al-
most 800% higher bilateral physician flows than countries
with different languages.
EU and Schengen membership leads to a positive in-
crease in the immigration flows of doctors. The effect is
highly significant, particularly for pairs that are both
Schengen members. The coefficient from column 4 (full
model) indicates that Schengen member countries ex-
perience 98.77% higher bilateral flows of medical doctors
than non-Schengen countries.
A key rationale for attracting medical doctors from
abroad is a response to shortages in medical staff [49].
For this reason, in specification (2) we include variables
that describe the supply of medical doctors. The negative
coefficients on density of physicians indicates that a low
density determines an expansion of the health sector,
also by attracting physicians from abroad. On the other
hand, the density of medical graduates is positively asso-
ciated with higher inflows of medical doctors (columns 4
and 5). The results also reveal a positive relationship be-
tween migration inflows of medical doctors and physi-
cians’ remuneration in the destination country. The
estimated coefficients (columns 4 and 5) suggest that a
10% increase in wages increases migration inflows of
medical doctors by around 20%.
We further find that the various demand-side factors
are differently correlated with physicians’ brain drain.
Higher health spending per capita in destination coun-
tries does not have a conclusive effect on the number of
migrant arrivals. A distinct pictures emerges when we
look at health insurance coverage. It seems that a high
share of the population covered by health insurance is
not necessarily favourable for attracting medical doctors
from abroad. The estimate is negative, and statistically
significant across all specifications, even after controlling
for supply factors. The coefficient of log age dependency
Table 1 Summary statistics
Observations Mean SD Min. Max.
Yearly Inflow 73,508 5.394 49.089 0 3640
Destination Controls
Unemployment rate 70,688 7.464 3.237 2.558 26.117
PISA Scorereading 73,508 497.228 20.287 428 547
Dyadic Controls
Ratio GDPo/GDPd 71,346 0.427 0.852 0.002 15.444
Stock of high-skilled migrants (2000) 71,924 7707.40 33,212.59 1 508,333
Distance 73,508 6812.444 4344.516 53.532 19,586.18
Colony 73,508 .041 .198 0 1
Common language 73,508 .120 .325 0 1
Contiguity 73,508 .019 .136 0 1
Both in EU 73,508 .061 .239 0 1
Both in Schengen 73,508 .056 .23 0 1
Supply-side Controls
Density of physicians per 1000 population 68,996 3.13 .710 1.3 5.3
Medical graduates per 100,000 population 72,756 10.437 3.938 3.84 24.44
Remuneration of physicians (US$ PPP) 67,680 118,588.7 58,193.76 20,603.21 271,125.1
Medical technology 53,580 17.703 9.743 4.89 43.87
Demand-side Controls
Public expenditures (US$ /capita) 73,508 3257.057 1644.86 425.6 9832.317
Health insurance coverage 70,124 98.528 3.909 69.8 100.2
Age dependency ratio 73,508 23.403 4.835 9.623 35.660
Hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants 70,688 4.849 1.866 2.05 9.12
The table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the gravity model
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ratio is positive, and highly statistically significant. Simi-
larly, once we control for the supply factors, the number
of hospital beds is significantly correlated with immigra-
tion flows of medical doctors, which indicates that in-
patient sector infrastructure is correlated with the
demand for medical doctors from abroad.
In the last column we also control for medical tech-
nology, as a proxy for health system infrastructure. We
find a positive and highly statistically significant relation-
ship between medical infrastructure and inflows of
foreign-trained doctors. The results reveal that better




This paper examines the channels through which OECD
countries attract physicians from abroad. We show that
a lower unemployment rate at the destination increases
migration flows among medical doctors. This confirms
previous empirical results, indicating that a higher em-
ployment rate is directly associated with an increasing
trend in the volume highly-skilled migrants [24, 37].
Contrary to previous research on highly-skilled migra-
tion [19], our results also suggest that PISA test scores
are positively correlated with greater inflows of medical
doctors. Therefore, the number of foreign-trained
Table 2 Determinants of migration flows of medical doctors (2000–2016)
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Destination Controls
Log Unemployment rate [t-1] −0.091 (0.24) − 0.669c (0.18) − 0.270 (0.22) − 0.916c (0.18) −1.119c (0.17)
Log PISA Scorereading [t-1] −0.036 (2.34) − 0.540 (1.97) − 0.796 (2.20) −0.901 (1.79) 4.894b (2.17)
Dyadic Controls
Log GDPo/GDPd [t-1] −0.222 (0.34) 0.289 (0.34) −0.037 (0.34) 0.932c (0.34) 1.545c (0.35)
Log Diaspora [2000] 0.004 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 0.014 (0.01) 0.014 (0.01) 0.034c (0.01)
Log Distance −0.691c (0.07) −0.697c (0.07) −0.847c (0.06) −0.864c (0.07) − 0.635c (0.07)
Colonial-tie dummy 0.591c (0.10) 0.600c (0.09) 0.598c (0.10) 0.613c (0.09) 0.558c (0.11)
Common language dummy 2.415c (0.16) 2.375c (0.18) 2.227c (0.11) 2.168c (0.12) 2.679c (0.11)
Contiguity dummy −0.205b (0.09) −0.265c (0.09) −0.266c (0.09) − 0.365c (0.08) − 0.135 (0.13)
Both in EU 0.097 (0.10) 0.205a (0.12) 0.028 (0.10) 0.131 (0.11) 0.624c (0.13)
Both in Schengen 0.712c (0.11) 0.645c (0.12) 0.750c (0.09) 0.687c (0.10) 0.276b (0.14)
Supply factors
Log Remuneration of physicians [t-1] 1.651a (0.87) 1.998b (0.91) 2.107b (0.85)
Log Density Physicians per 1000 population [t-1] −2.810c (0.70) −3.276c (0.69) −1.808c (0.64)
Log Medical Graduates per 100,000 population [t-1] −0.143 (0.35) 0.234 (0.34) 0.919c (0.30)
Log Medical Technology [t-1] 1.033c (0.40)
Demand factors
Log public health expenditures [t-1] −0.572 (0.63) 0.153 (0.64) 0.168 (0.51)
Log health insurance coverage [t-1] −3.105b (1.46) −5.232c (1.47) −3.337b (1.68)
Log Age dependency ratio, old [t-1] 4.853c (1.10) 2.891c (0.98) 4.684c (1.01)
Log Hospital beds [t-1] −0.410 (0.45) 0.803a (0.43) 1.397c (0.46)
Destination FE YES YES YES YES YES
Origin-time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Number of clusters (destination*time) 337 304 303 272 201
Observations 45,538 40,912 40,709 36,398 25,466
R-sqr 0.671 0.716 0.717 0.771 0.867
The table reports PPML estimates of the determinants of international migration in the destination country on the inflow of foreign-trained medical doctors. The
dependent variable represents the number of foreign-trained physicians who have obtained a (partially or fully) registration to practice as medical doctor in the
receiving country at time t
Estimation period: 2000–2016
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by destination and time. a, b, c indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively
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physicians is much greater in countries that have better
school systems. This finding is in line with previous
studies on doctors’ motivations to leave their origin
countries. A lack of good quality education in the home
country [50] and a better quality of life [51, 52], includ-
ing better education, are among the main reasons doc-
tors choose to migrate.
We have also analysed the influence of the ratio of GDP
per capita for the country of origin relative to the GDP
per capita for the country of destination on migration in-
flows. While the GDP for the country of destination ac-
counts for the incentive to migrate, the GDP in the home
country reflects both the incentive to go abroad, and the
ability to cover the costs of migration [41]. In this sense,
we expected a positive effect when the ability to cover the
migration costs dominates over the incentive effect, and a
negative sign when the incentive effect is higher than the
ability to finance the required investment. Results for our
preferred specifications reveal positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects of the GDP ratio on migration inflows.
This suggests that if the ability to cover the costs of migra-
tion predominates over the incentive effect, with all else
equal, the migration flows of medical doctors increase.
Moullan [14] finds similar results, showing that a higher
GDP per capita at the destination does not increase the in-
flows of medical professionals. This finding is also in line
with previous results reported by Grogger and Hanson
[53], Mayda [9] and Didisse et al. [54], who show how an
increase in GDP per capita in the home country may in-
crease emigration flows.
Furthermore, the diaspora in the destination country
does not seem to matter for the next waves of physician
inflows. This result is in line with those of Docquier and
Rapoport [55], who argue that past physician migration
does not influence the outward migration of medical
doctors from the country of origin. Our results, however,
contradict the evidence presented by Moullan [14], who
shows that diaspora has a positive effect on the migra-
tion flows of medical doctors. This different result could
be related to compositional effects, as his analysis refers
to the period of 1991–2004 while ours focuses on 2000–
2016. The difference could also be due to the fact that
we consider a higher number of developed destination
countries where network effects are usually less relevant
[17]. Moreover, it has been shown that, in general, dias-
pora encourages the migration of low-skilled over highly
skilled migrants [17, 40], and those from relatively poor
origin countries [56].
The language coefficients are positive, and have the
greatest magnitude among all dyadic controls; indicating
that sharing a common language is a more important
pull factor for medical doctors. This is very likely the
case, since, in general, medical doctors willing to prac-
tice in another country must prove advanced language
skills [3, 57]. But there also cases in which many foreign
doctors face language problems in the host country [44],
a relative lack of language skills being often perceived as
a sign of a lack of medical knowledge [58].
Several studies examining the relationship between the
characteristics of the health labour market and migration
flows of medical doctors [14, 46] posit that supply and
demand factors of healthcare professionals in the destin-
ation country are among the main drivers of physicians’
inflows from abroad. Our results indicate that a lower
density of physicians in the destination countries deter-
mines an expansion of the health sector, by attracting
physicians from abroad. This effect is slightly greater
than the effect in Moullan [14], and is statistically sig-
nificant even after controlling for the demand factors.
On the other hand, we show that the density of medical
graduates is positively associated with higher inflows of
medical doctors. This result is in line with the findings
of Moullan [14], who also observes a positive correlation.
One explanation might be that the size of the tertiary
education system is highly correlated with the country
size, which, in turn, is a determining factor in attracting
a workforce from abroad [54]. The positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient on the remuneration of phy-
sicians indicates that higher wages in the destination
country trigger out migration in origin countries. This
finding is in line with the argument that better wages
represent a major reason for migration in the case of
health professionals [59, 60].
We additionally find that the various demand factors
are differently correlated with physicians’ brain drain.
Greater health spending per capita in destination coun-
tries does not have a conclusive effect on the number of
migrant arrivals. A distinct picture emerges when we
look at health insurance coverage. It seems that a high
share of the population covered by health insurance is
not necessary favourable for attracting medical doctors
from abroad. Our results also reveal that demographic
conditions in receiving countries favour increased in-
flows of medical doctors. This result reinforces the idea
that an aging population will increase the demand for
health professionals, and will thus intensify migration;
since physicians flows are responsive to changes in the
share of the elderly population [13]. Similarly, once we
control for the supply factors, the number of hospital
beds is significantly correlated with immigration flows of
medical doctors, indicating that inpatient sector infra-
structure is correlated with the demand for medical doc-
tors from abroad.
We also find a positive and highly significant relation-
ship between medical infrastructure and the inflows of
foreign-trained doctors. The results reveal that better
health care resources in a medical system attracts physi-
cians from abroad.
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Taken together, the results of this section suggest that
aside from a low unemployment rate and a larger gap in
GDP per capita, both the characteristics of the health-
care system, and the population’s needs for healthcare
goods in the host country are highly correlated with the
utility of migration to the respective country.
Heterogeneity analysis
Thus far in our analysis, we have focused on the associ-
ation between migration flows of physicians and various
determinants at the destination, regardless of country of
origin or time of migration. These overall effects may ob-
scure a differential reaction of physicians to various deter-
minants at the destination between countries of origin.
Moreover, given that recent data provides evidence of sev-
eral disruptions in migration flows, including those of
medical doctors, we might expect discrepancies in the re-
lationship between the migration of medical doctors and
characteristics of receiving countries. Therefore, the ana-
lysis of heterogeneity effects is crucial for acquiring a bet-
ter understanding of physicians’ brain drain in the last two
decades. Table 3 presents the PPML estimates for our pre-
ferred specification (full model) for the following key sub-
groups as sending countries: African countries (column
1), Asian countries (column 2), and Central and Eastern
European countries16 (column 3). Furthermore, for whole
sample, we make a distinction between two time periods:
before the economic crisis (2000–2006) and during the
economic crisis (2007–2012). It should be noted that the
second period selected covers not only the economic crisis
and the post-crisis period, but also EU enlargement with
the addition of two countries (Romania and Bulgaria), as
well as the implementation of the Directive 2005/36/EC
on the recognition of professional qualifications, including
medical and nursing training.
Our heterogeneity analysis reveals that physicians from
African countries are particularly attracted to countries
that offer higher wages, and by those where the density
of medical doctors is relatively low. This result hinges
on shortages of medical doctors, which explains the rela-
tive attractiveness of that destination for African health
professionals. In their case, colonial links play an import-
ant role in their choice of destination. Concurrently,
higher demand for healthcare services and better med-
ical technology at the destination drive an increase in
the inflow of medical doctors from Central and Eastern
Europe, whereas Asian medical doctors seem to migrate
to countries that have a better school system, offer
higher wages, and which have a low density of medical
doctors. Destination countries with a higher proportion
of elderly individuals and a high number of hospital beds
are particularly attractive to medical doctors from Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries. We also find that
the presence of a diaspora favoured migration inflows
among physicians only for those coming from Asia or
Central and Eastern European countries.
Further analysis shows that better equipped health sys-
tems (good remuneration, greater density of medical
technology, a younger health industry workforce) were
more attractive to foreign medical doctors during the
economic crisis than prior to 2007. The results also re-
veal that between 2007 and 2012, EU member countries
experienced 73.50% higher bilateral flows of medical
doctors than non-EU countries. We also note that sup-
ply factors affecting the healthcare system at the destin-
ation played a more important role during the economic
crisis than before 2007, with foreign physicians particu-
larly attracted to those countries offering higher wages,
better medical infrastructure and a lower density of
medical doctors.
All in all, the results in Table 3 demonstrate that
country groups and time periods are sources of hetero-
geneity in the relationship between both migration flows
of medical doctors, and pull factors at destinations.
Robustness
In this section, we provide a set of robustness checks that
deal with alternative sample restrictions. Table 4 shows
these results based on our preferred specification (column
5, Table 2). First, we restrict our sample by using only 6-
year periods (2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016). In
doing so, we further control for possible endogeneity and
mitigate the risk of reverse causality. Secondly, we perform
the analysis using data only for the period 2004–2016, and
dropping those years for which we have relatively more
missing values than for the whole sample.
The results confirm that our findings are not driven by
specific time periods.17
Limitations
There are at least four caveats to the present study. First,
time series data provided by the OECD is incomplete, as
some countries did not provide relevant information for
specific years. However, we succeed in overcoming this
shortfall by applying econometric techniques that success-
fully deal with the presence of a high proportion of zero
values in the data. Secondly, the OECD Health Workforce
Migration dataset does not capture physicians who may
have migrated to other countries, but who are not working
16Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, and Ukraine.
17We additionally perform a LINK test [61] in order to check evidence
for miss-specification of our gravity full model (results are available
upon request). This test provides no evidence for miss-specification of
our gravity full model.
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as doctors. Thirdly, our dataset does not exclude multiple
migrations. It is very likely that medical doctors migrate to
more than one destination country in their lifetime. Thus,
a country of destination at one point in time might be-
come the country of origin, when a person later decides to
make a further move to someplace other than his/her na-
tive country. Finally, we have not been able to find de-
tailed information on specific restrictions in destination
countries applicable to the medical profession such as lan-
guage qualifications, additional licensing or certification
Table 3 Subgroup analysis
Sending regions / time period Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











−1.221c (0.27) −0.258 (0.65) −2.074c (0.39)
Log PISA Scorereading [t-1] −3.543 (5.67) 15.252c
(4.54)
9.973c (3.62) 7.349 (10.81) −2.300 (7.15)
Dyadic Controls
Log GDPo/GDPd [t-1] 1.372 (1.17) 0.200 (0.36) 2.204c (0.69) 0.090 (0.63) 2.652b (1.27)
Log Diaspora [2000] −0.533c
(0.08)
0.573c (0.19) 0.353c (0.06) 0.457c (0.11) 0.461c (0.11)
Log Distance −0.880c
(0.25)
0.026 (0.32) −0.979c (0.20) − 0.864c (0.12) −0.629c (0.12)
Colonial-tie dummy 2.478c (0.29) 1.360c (0.11) −1.345c (0.21) 0.912c (0.17) 0.463b (0.18)
Common language dummy 1.202c (0.29) 0.826c (0.24) – 2.082c (0.13) 2.633c (0.16)
Contiguity dummy 0.237 (0.56) 6.143c (0.91) 1.322c (0.23) 0.128 (0.26) −0.178 (0.17)
Both in EU – – 0.145 (0.18) 0.256 (0.21) 0.551c (0.18)
Both in Schengen – – 0.028 (0.17) 1.193c (0.23) 0.475b (0.21)
Supply factors
Log Remuneration of physicians [t-1] 9.001c (3.15) 4.789c (1.39) −0.558 (1.40) 1.050 (1.88) 6.832a (3.81)






−0.016 (1.11) 0.256 (1.36) −6.352b (2.73)
Log Medical Graduates per 100,000
population [t-1]
1.078 (0.84) −0.222 (0.50) 1.580c (0.46) 0.398 (0.41) 2.621c (0.96)
Log Medical Technology [t-1] 4.150c (1.08) −0.220 (0.55) 1.784c (0.53) 1.012 (0.65) 3.071c (0.78)
Demand factors
Log public health expenditures [t-1] −1.844a
(1.00)
−0.142 (0.54) 0.720 (0.73) 1.026 (1.30) −3.593a (2.06)




2.184 (4.06) −33.308 (47.68) 9.192 (11.07)
Log Age dependency ratio, old [t-1] −21.085c
(6.81)
−0.458 (3.37) 4.225c (1.40) 8.003b (3.38) −16.769c (5.74)
Log Hospital beds [t-1] −4.016c
(1.24)
−0.098 (0.38) 2.829c (0.97) −3.089 (2.03) 1.227 (1.20)
Destination FE YES YES YES YES YES
Origin-time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Number of clusters (destination*time) 168 153 196 54 78
Observations 4193 4532 2495 6549 9726
R-sqr 0.974 0.978 0.742 0.955 0.787
The table reports PPML estimates of the determinants of international migration in the destination country on the inflow of medical doctors from Africa, Asia and
Central and Eastern Europe. The dependent variable represents the number of foreign-trained physicians who have obtained a (partially or fully) registration to
practice as medical doctor in the receiving country at time t
Estimation period: 2000–2016
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by destination and time. a, b, c indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively
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requirements. Compiling a comprehensive dataset on
these requirements and testing their influence on medical
migration flows is an area for future research.
Conclusion
This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the
channels through which OECD countries attract medical
doctors from abroad. More specifically, this study uses
the new module on health worker migration provided by
OECD for 2000–2016 in order to examine the determi-
nants of migration flows for foreign-trained physicians.
Applying a gravity model approach, and using the
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator, we find
that, apart from dyadic factors, a lower unemployment
rate, good remuneration of physicians, an aging
population, and a good medical infrastructure in the
host country are among the main drivers of physicians’
brain drain. Furthermore, performing an analysis on the
mobility of medical doctors from various continents (Af-
rica, Asia and Europe), we find that utility from migra-
tion to specific countries may be explained by the
heterogeneity of origin countries.
Specifically, we show that physicians from African
countries are particularly attracted to destinations offer-
ing higher wages, and where the density of medical doc-
tors is relatively low. This result hinges on shortages of
medical doctors, which explains the relative attractive-
ness of that destination to African health professionals.
In their case, colonial links also play an important role
in the choice of destination. At the same time, higher
Table 4 Robustness checks
Pseudo - Poisson Maximum Likelihood
(1) (2)
2004–2016 6-year period (2001, 2004,
2007, 2010, 2013, 2016)
Destination controls
Log Unemployment rate [t-1] −1.278c (0.18) −0.915c (0.26)
Log PISA Scorereading [t-1] 4.359a (2.43) 4.903 (4.39)
Dyadic Controls
Log GDPo/GDPd [t-1] 1.796c (0.41) 1.264c (0.47)
Log Diaspora [2000] 0.033c (0.01) 0.032 (0.02)
Log Distance −0.645c (0.07) −0.599c (0.12)
Colonial-tie dummy 0.439c (0.10) 0.557c (0.18)
Common language dummy 2.779c (0.11) 2.641c (0.17)
Contiguity dummy −0.194 (0.13) −0.188 (0.20)
Both in EU 0.578c (0.13) 0.753c (0.21)
Both in Schengen 0.247a (0.14) 0.319 (0.23)
Supply factors
Log Remuneration of physicians [t-1] 2.812c (0.83) 1.393 (1.10)
Log Density Physicians per 1000 population [t-1] −2.420c (0.70) −2.038c (0.76)
Log Medical Graduates per 100,000 population [t-1] 1.433c (0.43) 0.994a (0.58)
Log Medical Technology [t-1] 0.991b (0.44) 1.057a (0.63)
Demand factors
Log public health expenditures [t-1] 0.209 (0.51) 0.226 (1.30)
Log health insurance coverage [t-1] −3.114a (1.84) −3.835 (2.37)
Log Age dependency ratio [t-1] 2.146a (1.14) 5.279c (1.75)
Log Hospital beds [t-1] 1.304c (0.47) 1.446a (0.85)
Destination FE YES YES
Origin-time FE YES YES
Number of clusters (destination*time) 172 74
Observations 22,232 9174
R-sqr 0.827 0.846
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by destination and time. a, b, c indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively
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demand for healthcare services and better medical tech-
nology at the destination increase the inflow of medical
doctors from Central and Eastern Europe, whereas Asian
medical doctors appear to preferentially migrate to
countries that have a better school system, and which
offer higher wages.
Further analysis shows that better equipped health sys-
tems (good remuneration, higher medical technology,
young health workforce) were more attractive for foreign
medical doctors during the economic crisis than before
2007. We also find that the presence of a diaspora en-
courages migration inflows among physicians, although
only for some specific continents of origin.
Overall, these results draw attention to several factors
that affect medical doctors’ decisions to migrate. Policy
makers intending to address the personnel shortages in
the health care systems could consider these factors when
designing strategies to facilitate the entry for foreign phy-
sicians, particularly in those countries that have to cope
with an aging population and a growing number of people
in need of medical services.
Appendix
List of origin countries
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cayman Is- lands, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France,
Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong,
China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea,
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mal- dives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russia, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
List of destination countries
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
the United States.
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